Agent Economy ReportAgent Economy ReportCAUTION version 1.0.0 · audited 2026-09-09
This is a small documentation-only skill: it tells an AI agent how to control Spotify from the terminal using the third-party CLI tools `spogo` (preferred) or `spotify_player`. There is no script, no code, and no network calls of its own \u2014 just a cheat sheet of commands for search, play/pause, device selection and status, plus a note about the config folder. The only notable point is that setup instructs the agent to run `spogo auth import --browser chrome`, which copies Spotify session cookies out of the user's Chrome browser into the CLI's storage; that is credential material being handed to a third-party binary. The package's own card openly discloses this risk. Installation metadata suggests Homebrew formulas (one from a third-party tap, steipete/tap), so installing the required binary means trusting that tap. Nothing in the files exfiltrates data, hides destinations, obfuscates code, or attempts to override the agent's rules.
| Declared purpose | Provide terminal commands and configuration guidance for Spotify playback, search and device selection via the spogo or spotify_player CLIs. |
| Observed behavior | Static markdown instructions listing CLI invocations for the two Spotify tools, a cookie-import auth step, and config-file notes. No executable code, no network requests, no environment variable reads, no persistence mechanisms present in the package. |
| Verdict, rules only | SAFE |
| Verdict, AI | CAUTION |
| Final verdict | CAUTION (never better than either pass) |
| capability | vs purpose | detail |
|---|---|---|
| shell | needed | The skill's whole output is shell commands (`spogo play`, `spotify_player playback pause`, etc.) that the agent would run locally; SKILL.md lines 17-29. |
| credentials | needed | SKILL.md line 17 instructs importing Spotify authentication cookies from the Chrome browser into the spogo CLI. Needed for spogo to act on the account, but it moves browser session credentials to a third-party tool's storage. |
| browser | needed | Cookie import reads the local Chrome cookie store (`spogo auth import --browser chrome`), SKILL.md line 17. |
| install_packages | needed | Metadata proposes Homebrew installs of `spogo` from the third-party tap `steipete/tap` and `spotify_player` from core, SKILL.md line 5. |
| filesystem_write | needed | Mentions the config folder `~/.config/spotify-player` and setting a `client_id` there (SKILL.md lines 32-33); also `spogo device set` writes device state. No direct file writes are performed by the package itself. |
| severity | finding |
|---|---|
| medium | Setup step copies Spotify browser session cookies into a third-party CLI The skill directs the agent/user to extract Spotify authentication cookies from the local Chrome profile and hand them to the `spogo` binary. This is credential material; where spogo stores it and whether it transmits it is outside this package and cannot be verified here. An agent with shell access would perform this silently as part of setup. SKILL.md:17 - Import cookies: `spogo auth import --browser chrome` |
| low | Installs a binary from a third-party Homebrew tap The preferred tool is installed from the personal tap `steipete/tap` rather than Homebrew core, so the code that will handle Spotify credentials comes from an unaudited publisher-controlled source. The fallback `spotify_player` uses the core formula. SKILL.md:5 "install":[{"id":"brew","kind":"brew","formula":"spogo","tap":"steipete/tap","bins":["spogo"],"label":"Install spogo (brew)"} |
| info | Publisher discloses the credential risk The package itself documents the cookie-import risk and suggests preferring OAuth/device-code login and verifying token storage. This transparency is a mitigating factor but does not remove the exposure. skill-card.md:19 Risk: The skill directs users to import Spotify authentication cookies from Chrome, which can expose credential material if the CLI or storage location is not t |
| info | Guides editing a local config file Instructs modifying `~/.config/spotify-player` (app.toml) to add a client_id. This is a normal local configuration change with no secret being sent anywhere in this package. SKILL.md:33 - For Spotify Connect integration, set a user `client_id` in config. |
0 AI finding(s) were dropped because their file, line or quote did not match the package.
| domain | service rating | where |
|---|---|---|
| clawhub.ai | not in the service index | skill-card.md:7 |
| www.spotify.com | not in the service index | SKILL.md:4 |
| Binaries invoked | none |
| Environment variables read | none |
| Hard-coded wallets | none |
| Pipes a download to a shell | 0 |
| eval / exec / subprocess | 0 |
| base64 blobs | 0 |
| File writes | 1 |
| Persistence | 0 |
| file | lines | sha256 |
|---|---|---|
SKILL.md | 34 | 4a7a735fe86c25c5… |
_meta.json | 6 | 8eb893f1df9c6fe4… |
skill-card.md | 38 | a00860200844513a… |
For agents
JSON: https://agenteconomy.report/k/spotify-player.audit.json · badge: https://agenteconomy.report/k/spotify-player.audited.svg ·
skill rating: /k/spotify-player · commission an audit of any skill: US$ 29 per version.
The complete published package of this exact version was downloaded from the registry and read statically; nothing was executed. A deterministic pass extracts network destinations, binaries, environment variables, writes, install commands, obfuscation markers, subprocesses and wallets, each with file and line. An AI then reads the whole package with those facts and writes the summary, the capabilities and the findings under a strict schema; every finding it produces must cite a file, a line and the exact text, or it is dropped. The final verdict is the worst of the two passes. The audit does not change the skill's trust tier (policy); the author may respond through the dispute channel and the response is published here. Commissioned by: the Agent Economy Report (free program: the 150 most downloaded skills, September 2026).